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CHENAULT V. HUIE1: DENYING THE EXISTENCE OF A LEGAL DUTY BETWEEN A MOTHER
AND HER UNBORN CHILD
“The absence of precedent should afford no refuge to those who by their
wrongful act, if such be proved, have invaded the right of an individual.”2
I. INTRODUCTION
When an unborn child is injured by its mother, and subsequently born
alive, who should be protected? The Court of Appeals of Texas, in Chenault v.
Huie,3 feared the slippery slope,4 and gave deference to the mother when it
denied the existence of a legal duty between mother and fetus.5 Few cases6
have directly addressed a child’s tort action against her mother for prenatal
substance abuse that resulted in injuries sustained while en ventre sa mere.7
This Note discusses the general background of a child’s right to sue for
fetal injury and the liability of the individuals that cause the fetal harm.
Specifically, this Note focuses on the fallacy of the Texas court’s8 refusal to
establish a legal duty arising from the relationship of a mother to her unborn
child.
II. BACKGROUND
Like the fetus who develops within her mother’s womb until she reaches
1

989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999, no writ).
Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F.Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946) (quoting Justice McGuire). “And what
right is more inherent, and more sacrosanct, than that of the individual in his possession and
enjoyment of his life, his limbs and his body?” Id. (completing Justice McGuire’s thoughts).
3
989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999, no writ).
4
Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d at 478. “[T]he recognition of a general legal duty of care owed
by a pregnant woman to her fetus, which is a necessary prerequisite to imposing any tort
liability on Huie, has far broader implications than simply holding drug-abusing mothers
civilly liable to their later born children.” Id.
5
Id. “We conclude, therefore, that current law in Texas relating to negligent and grossly
negligent conduct does not impose or encompass a general legal duty owed by a mother to
her fetus.” Id.
6
See discussion infra Part IV. See also State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992). Gray, the
mother, was indicted for child endangerment since she had given birth to a cocaine-addicted
baby. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court denied the existence of the parent-child relationship since
Gray “did not become a parent until the birth of the child.” Id. at 710-11. See generally
Deborah Ann Bailey, Comment, Maternal Substance Abuse: Does Ohio Have an Answer?
17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1019 (1992) (discussing the magnitude of the maternal substance abuse
problem, as well as detailing maternal use of cocaine and the effects of that usage).
7
“In its mother’s womb.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 534 (6th ed. 1990).
8
Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999, no writ).
2
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maturity, the law concerning prenatal torts is also developing but has not yet
matured. Chenault9 is the most recent case10 to consider whether a child may
sustain a cause of action against a mother for prenatal injury.11 To put this
case in perspective, the following areas of law are discussed in relation to the
elements within Chenault12: The Fetus as a Person; Parental Immunity; ThirdParty Liability for Fetal Injury; Criminal Punishment for Fetal Abuse; and Public
Policy.
A. The Fetus as a Person
Three different theories have evolved surrounding a child’s right to sue
based on a prenatal injury: Entity Theory,13 Viability Theory,14 and Biological
9

Id.
Chenault was decided on April 15, 1999.
11
Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 474. “In this case of first impression, we address the question of
whether a woman may be held civilly liable for conduct engaged in while pregnant that causes
injury to her later born child.” Id.
12
Id.
13
“[T]he unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of the injury.” Dietrich v.
Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884). See also Ron Beal, “Can I Sue Mommy?” An Analysis
of a Woman’s Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 325, 327-31 (1984). Beal addresses the importance of the mother’s body to pregnancy
and its importance to the judiciary:
[T]he issue that will confront the courts is to determine when, once the
medical community can find the causal relationship between the injuries of
the child and the acts of a woman after conception and during prenatal
development, a woman’s responsibility should extend to such a result as a
matter of public policy.
The crux of this decision will be whether the courts will hold as a
matter of public policy that a woman should be held to a standard of
conduct toward her own body long before the actual duty arises due to
her continuing ability to conceive. Because of the fictional relationship
that will be imposed between a woman and a “being” inside of her own
body, the problem of knowledge of the existence of that being will be
paramount.
Id. at 364 (emphasis in original).
14
A viable child is “one capable of living outside of the womb.” Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F.Supp.
138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946). The Bonbrest court further states that a human being “has, if viable,
its own bodily form and members, manifests all of the anatomical characteristics of
individuality, possesses its own circulatory, vascular and excretory systems and is capable
now of being ushered into the visible world.” Id. at 141. See also Judith Kahn, Note, Of
Woman’s First Disobedience: Forsaking a Duty of Care to her Fetus--Is this a Mother’s
Crime?, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 807, 810-15 (1987) (discussing the legal status of the fetus). Kahn
further describes the dilemma facing the judiciary: “[t]oday, scientific advancements indicate
that using viability as the sole determinant of the potentiality of human life is medically
10
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Theory.15 Entwined within these theories is the “born alive” doctrine.16
1. Entity Theory
The first case to consider whether a child could sustain an action for
prenatal injury occurred in 1884,17 and was argued before the esteemed
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.18 The case involved a pregnant woman who
miscarried after falling on a defect in the highway.19 Since the injury occurred
to the mother, Holmes found no cause of action allowable from the fetus.20
unsound. Doctors and medical experts agree that viability is an indeterminate, fluid and
shifting concept.” Id. at 812.
15
See James Andrew Freeman, Comment, Prenatal Substance Abuse: Texas, Texans and
Future Texans Can’t Afford It, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 539, 564-66 (1996) (discussing the
development of fetal rights under the common law). Freeman reconciled the three theories:
“[T]he ‘biological theory’ which made no distinction between viability and nonviability, but
instead triggered liability if the fetus was born alive regardless of when the fetal injury
occurred.” Id. at 564.
16
See id. at 567. (“[T]he first prerequisite to fetal rights is the necessity for the child to be
born alive.”). See also Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884). The long history of the
born-alive doctrine is evidenced by Holmes’ opinion, in which he states, “Lord Coke’s rule
requires that the woman be quick with child, which, as this court has decided, means more
than pregnant, and requires that the child shall have reached some degree of quasi
independent life at the moment of the act.” Id. at 16. See also Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730
(Okla. Crim. App. 1994). The Hughes court chastises the history of the doctrine by stating:
[T]he antiquity of a rule is no measure of its soundness. “It is
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past” . . . Medical
science now . . . provide[s] competent proof as to whether the fetus
was alive at the time of a defendant’s conduct and whether [her]
conduct was the cause of [the injury] . . . .
Id. at 733.
17
Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
18
Oliver Wendell Holmes (1841-1935) served on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
from 1882-1902, and he wrote nearly one thousand opinions before President Theodore
Roosevelt appointed Holmes to the United States Supreme Court. Sheldon M. Novick,
Introduction to the Dover Edition of OLIVER W ENDELL HOLMES , THE COMMON LAW iii, xx-xxi
(General Publishing Company, Ltd. 1991).
19
Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 14-15. “There was testimony, however, based upon observing
motion in its limbs, that it did live for ten or fifteen minutes.” Id. at 15. It is interesting to note
this sentence, since it validates the strong history of the born-alive doctrine and the impact of
Holmes’ decision on fetal rights.
20
Id. at 17. Holmes reasoned:
If it should be argued that an action could be maintained in the
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Holmes considered the fetus to be part of the mother21 and did not regard the
fetus as a person.22 Therefore, the child had no standing to sue.23 It would be
more than sixty years after Holmes’ decision before the judiciary finally
recognized a cause of action for prenatal injury.24 The viability theory was
born.25
2. Viability Theory
In order to defeat Holmes’ entity theory, it was necessary to recognize

case supposed, and that, on general principles, an injury transmitted from
the actor to a person through his own organic substance, or through his
mother, before he became a person, stands on the same footing as an
injury transmitted to an existing person through other intervening
substances outsid e him, the argument in this general form is not helped,
but hindered . . . For, apart from the question of remoteness, the argument
would not be affected by the degree of maturity reached by the embryo at
the moment of the organic lesion or wrongful act.
Id. at 16.
21
It is interesting to note that Holmes’ father was a well-respected physician and lecturer at
Harvard Medical School. See Sheldon M. Novick, Introduction to the Dover Edition of
OLIVER W ENDELL HOLMES , THE COMMON LAW at iv (1991).
22
Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 14.
If a woman, between four and five months advanced in
pregnancy, by reason of falling upon a defective highway, is delivered of a
child, who survives his premature birth only a few minutes, such child is
not a “person,” within the meaning of the [law], . . . for the loss of whose
life an action may be maintained against the town by his administrator.
Id.
23
Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 16 (1884). Holmes concluded:
[T]he unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of the injury, any
damage to it which was not too remote to be recovered for at all was
recoverable by her, we think it clear that the statute sued upon does not
embrace the plaintiff’s intestate within its meaning; and have not found it
necessary to consider the question of remoteness or the effect of those
cases which declare that the statute liability of towns for defects in
highways is more narrowly restricted than the common law liability for
negligence.
Id. at 17.
24
See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 143 (D. D. C. 1946). Bette Gay Bonbrest was removed
from her mother’s uterus through the professional malpractice of J. Kotz. Id. at 139. Justice
McGuire addressed the slippery slope argument by stating “[t]hat a right of action in cases of
this character would lead to others brought in bad faith and might present insuperable
difficulties of proof—a premise with which I do not agree—is no argument.” Id. at 142-43.
25
So to speak.
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the fetus as a separate being from the mother.26 The perception of the fetus
as its own person was predicated upon the born-alive doctrine.27 Although the
fetus was within the womb, it became viable when it was capable of living
outside of the uterus.28 Scientific advancements have progressively reduced
the point of viability such that some jurisdictions are willing to legislate the exact
week a child is viable.29 The measure of viability is extremely important with
regard to a cause of action for fetal injury, since a viable child is generally
considered a person.30 Unless the fetus is legally recognized as a person, they

26

See Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp at 140-42. The Bonbrest court attacked Holmes’ entity theory:
As to a viable child being ‘part’ of its mother—this argument
seems to me to be a contradiction in terms. True, it is in the womb,
but it is capable now of extra-uterine life—and while dependent for its
continued development on sustenance derived from its peculiar
relationship to its mother, it is not a ‘part’ of the mother in the sense
of a constituent element—as that term is generally understood.
Modern medicine is replete with cases of living children being taken
from dead mothers.
Id. at 140.
27
See supra note 16 and accompanying text. See also Teresa Foley, Dobson v. Dobson: Tort
Liability for Expectant Mothers? 61 SASK. L. REV. 177 (1998). This article offers a discussion
on Canadian law, with respect to tort liability of mothers, through an analysis of the Dobson
case. Cynthia Dobson was negligently operating a motor vehicle and caused fetal injury to
her son Ryan. Id at 178. The Dobson court needed to determine whether Ryan had the legal
capacity to sue his own mother for his prenatal injuries. Id. Before holding that the
legislature should decide, the Court reasoned that “‘[w]hen the unborn child becomes a living
person and suffers damage as a result of prenatal injuries caused by the fault of the negligent
motorist the cause of action is completed.’” Id. at 179 (quoting [1972] 2 O.R. 686, 702
(Ont.H.C.)).
28
Bonbrest, 65 F.Supp. at 140. The court recognized that fetal dependence on sustenance did
not automatically mean that the fetus was part of the mother. Id. See also Bailey, supra note
6. Bailey states “that the unborn viable fetus was a child under the provision of Ohio’s child
abuse statute.” Id. at 1025 (citing In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935, 938 (Ohio C. P. 1986)).
29
See, e.g., H.B. 1947, 82nd Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1999) (amends code to change presumption of
viability from the 25th week to 24th week of pregnancy).
30
According to the Ohio 1999 Session Law Service, an adopted resolution that alters Ohio
Revised Code section 2901.01(B)(1)(a) defines a person to “include all of the following: (i) An
individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, and association; (ii) An
unborn human who is viable.” 1999 Ohio Laws 15. The enactment further defines:
(i) “Unborn human” means an individual organism of the species
homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth. (ii) “Viable” means the
stage of development of a human fetus at which there is a realistic
possibility of maintaining and nourishing of a life outside the womb
with or without temporary artificial life-sustaining support.
Id.
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have no standing within the courts to bring suit.31
3. Biological Theory
The biological theory mirrors the viability theory except that a child32
may bring a cause of action for injuries sustained from the moment of
fertilization.33 This theory applies primarily to third-party liability for fetal
injury.34
B. Parental Immunity
Parental immunity is a means by which a parent may avoid legal liability
based solely on the existence of a relationship between parent and child.35
Virtually all jurisdictions36 have abrogated parental immunity to varying
degrees.37 In a surprising opinion,38 the Chenault court contended that
31

“‘Standing to sue’ means that party has sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable
controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1405 (6th ed. 1990).
32
The child must be born alive. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
33
See Freeman, supra note 15, at 564. See also Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960).
Sean Smith was injured in an automobile accident while in his mother’s womb. Id. at 498. As
a result of the injury, Sean was born with deformities in his legs and feet. Id.
The most important consideration, however, is that the viability distinction
has no relevance to the injustice of denying recovery for harm which can
be proved to have resulted from the wrongful act of another. Whether
viable or not at the time of the injury, the child sustains the same harm after
birth, and therefore should be given the same opportunity for redress.
Id. at 504.
34
See discussion infra Part II.C.
35
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
36
Louisiana is the only state to retain parental immunity. See Bondurant v. Bondurant, 386
So.2d 705 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (retaining parental immunity as proscribed by LA. REV. STAT .
A NN. § 571 (West 1999)).
37
Current status of parental immunity throughout the United States:
ALABAMA , Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So.2d 264, 266 (Ala. 1989) (creating an exception to
parental immunity for sexual abuse).
ALASKA, Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1967) (creating an exception to
parental immunity for negligent driving).
ARIZONA , Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 P.2d 43 (Ariz. 1995) (abrogating parental
immunity).
ARKANSAS, Robinson v. Robinson, 914 S.W.2d 292 (Ark. 1996) (creating an exception
to parental immunity for willful tort committed by parent).
CALIFORNIA, Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971) (abrogating parental
immunity).
COLORADO, Terror Min. Co., Inc. v. Roter, 866 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1994) (creating an
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exception to parental immunity for negligence committed by parent in the pursuit of
business or employment activities).
CONNECTICUT , Ascuitto v. Farricielli, 711 A.2d 708 (Conn. 1998) (creating exceptions
to parental immunity for negligence committed by parent in the pursuit of business or
employment activities and for sexual abuse).
DELAWARE , Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976) (creating an exception to
parental immunity for negligence committed by parent to the limits of parental
automobile liability insurance coverage).
D.C., Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416 (D.C. 1987) (declining to adopt doctrine of
parental immunity).
FLORIDA , Herzfeld v. Herzfeld, 732 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review
granted Aug. 23, 1999 No. 95,054 (creating exceptions to parental immunity for
negligence committed by parent to the limits of parental liability insurance coverage
and for sexual abuse).
GEORGIA, Yates v. Lowe, 348 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (creating an exception
to parental immunity for negligence committed by parent to the limits of parental
liability insurance coverage).
HAWAII, Petersen v. City and County of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007 (Haw. 1969).
IDAHO, Farmer’s Ins. Group v. Reed, 712 P.2d 550 (Idaho 1985) (creating an exception
to parental immunity for negligence committed by parent to the limits of parental
automobile liability insurance coverage).
ILLINOIS, Nudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1956) (creating exception for willful
and wanton misconduct by the parent).
INDIANA , Fager v. Hundt, 610 N.E.2d 246 (Ind. 1993) (creating exception for intentional
felonious act of parent).
IOWA , Frideres v. Schiltz, 540 N.W.2d 261 (Iowa 1995) (creating an exception to
parental immunity for sexual abuse).
KANSAS, Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135 (Kan. 1980) (creating an exception
to parental immunity for negligence in operation of motor vehicle).
KENTUCKY, Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970) (creating exceptions for
reasonable expressions of parental authority and for parental discretion over care of
the child).
LOUISIANA , Bondurant v. Bondurant, 386 So.2d 705 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (retaining
parental immunity as proscribed by LA. REV. STAT . ANN.§ 571 (West 1999)).
MAINE , Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Me. 1979) (creating an exception to parental
immunity for negligence committed by parent to the limits of parental insurance
coverage).
MARYLAND, Hatzinicolas v. Protopapas, 550 A.2d 947 (Md. 1988) (creating an
exception to parental immunity for negligence committed by parent in the pursuit of
partnership business or employment activities).
MASSACHUSETTS, Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975) (parental
immunity for negligence committed by parent to the limits of parental automobile
liability insurance coverage).
MICHIGAN, Plumley v, Klein, 199 N.W.2d 169 (Mich. 1972) (limiting parental immunity
to reasonable expressions of parental authority and for parental discretion over care of
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the child).
MINNESOTA, Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980) (abrogating parental
immunity and creating the reasonable parent standard).
MISSISSIPPI, Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So.2d 906 (Miss. 1992) (creating an exception
to parental immunity for negligent operation of motor vehicle).
MISSOURI, Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1991) (abrogating parental
immunity and creating the reasonable parent standard).
MONTANA , Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 656 P.2d 820 (Mont. 1983) (creating an
exception to parental immunity for negligent operation of motor vehicle).
NEBRASKA, Clasen v. Pruhs, 95 N.W. 640 (Neb. 1903) (creating an exception to
parental immunity for inhuman and cruel treatment).
NEVADA , Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 (Nev. 1974) (declining to adopt doctrine of
parental immunity).
NEW HAMPSHIRE , Briere v, Briere, 224 A.2d 588 (N.H. 1966) (creating an exception to
parental immunity for negligence committed by parent to the limits of parental
insurance coverage).
NEW JERSEY, France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 267 A.2d 490 (N.J. 1970) (creating an
exception to parental immunity for negligent operation of motor vehicle).
NEW MEXICO, Guess v. Gulf Ins., 627 P.2d 869 (N.M. 1981) (abrogating parental
immunity).
NEW YORK , Gelbman v. Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d 192 (N.Y. 1969) (creating an exception
to parental immunity for nonwillful tort committed by parent).
NORTH CAROLINA , Carver v. Carver, 314 S.E.2d 739 (N.C. 1984) (creating an exception
to parental immunity for negligent operation of motor vehicle).
NORTH DAKOTA, Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967) (abrogating parental
immunity).
OHIO, Kirchner v. Crystal, 474 N.E.2d 275 (Ohio 1984) (abrogating parental immunity).
OKLAHOMA, Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984) (creating an exception to
parental immunity for negligence committed by parent to the limits of parental
automobile liability insurance coverage).
OREGON, Chaffin v. Chaffin, 397 P.2d 771 (Or. 1964) (creating exception for willful and
wanton misconduct by the parent).
PENNSYLVANIA, Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1971) (abrogating parental
immunity).
RHODE ISLAND, Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013 (R.I. 1982) (creating an exception to
parental immunity for negligent operation of motor vehicle).
SOUTH CAROLINA , Elam v. Elam, 268 S.E.2d 109 (S.C. 1980) (abrogating parental
immunity).
TENNESSEE, Broadwell v. Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1994) (limiting parental
immunity to reasonable expressions of parental authority, to parental discretion over
care of the child, and to parental supervision).
TEXAS, Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971) (limiting parental immunity
to reasonable expressions of parental authority, to parental discretion over care of the
child).
UTAH, Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980) (creating an exception to parental
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parental immunity presupposes the existence of a duty, and therefore, an
absence of duty precludes the need to consider parental immunity.
C. Third-Party Liability for Fetal Injury
Third-party liability was first recognized in Bonbrest v. Kotz.39 The
Bonbrest child40 was negligently removed from her mother’s womb through
professional malpractice.41 The court allowed a right of action for a child, born
alive, to sue the negligent third party, regardless of the gestational stage that
the injury occurred.42

immunity for sexual abuse)
VERMONT , Wood v. Wood, 370 A.2d 191 (Vt. 1977) (declining to adopt doctrine of
parental immunity).
VIRGINIA, Smith v. Kauffman, 183 S.E.2d 190 (Va. 1971) (creating an exception to
parental immunity in automobile accident cases).
W ASHINGTON, Chhuth v. George, 719 P.2d 562 (Wash. 1986) (creating an exception to
parental immunity for willful and wanton misconduct by the parent).
W EST VIRGINIA, Courtney v. Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 418 (W. Va. 1991) (creating
exceptions to parental immunity for negligence committed by parent to the limits of
parental automobile liability insurance coverage and for willful misconduct by the
parent).
W ISCONSIN, Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963) (limiting parental immunity to
exercises of parental authority and parental discretion over care of the child).
W YOMING, Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153 (Wyo. 1992) (abrogating parental
immunity in cases of ordinary negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle).
38
Nearly one-third of Appellant’s Brief is dedicated to the inapplicability of parental
immunity. See Brief for Appellant at 23-31, Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No.
05-96-00279-CV).
The Doctrine of Parental Immunity was not intended to
protect the type of wil[l]ful, intentional, and foreseeable injury to
result to a child at the hands of its parents, and then provide
protection to the parent. Even in the unlikely event that the court
were to hold that Appellee’s actions fall within the intended scope of
the Parental Immunity Doctrine, her actions are still not immune
since they fall within a specific exception previously established and
recognized by the Texas courts.
Id. at 31. (referring to Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Soignet, 1994 WL 720014, at *11 (Tex.
App. 1994, judgment set aside) (holding that willful conduct is the “result of conscious
indifference to the rights, safety or welfare of the person affected by it.”).
39
65 F.Supp. 138, 143 (D.D.C. 1946).
40
Bette Gay Bonbrest. Available in WL synopsis of Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F.Supp. 138 (D.D.C.
1946).
41
Id. at 139.
42
Id. at 141.
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D. Criminal Punishment for Fetal Abuse
The prosecution of pregnant women for substance abuse helps women
to find treatment and protects the health of the fetus.43 All jurisdictions punish
the use of controlled substances,44 and the delivery of controlled substances to
an unborn child is punishable in some jurisdictions.45 One Michigan appellate
court held that prenatal use of drugs is probative of future child neglect.46 In
addition, there is a trend, for criminal purposes, to include unborn humans
within the definition of a person.47 In re Ruiz48 was decided at the Ohio trial
court level. Ruiz held that a viable fetus qualifies as a child for the purposes of
child abuse statutes.49 As discussed supra, parental immunity does not protect
a parent from willful misconduct.50
43

See Tiffany M. Romney, Comment, Prosecuting Mothers of Drug-Exposed Babies: The
State’s Interest in Protecting the Rights of a Fetus Versus the Mother’s Constitutional
Rights to Due Process, Privacy and Equal Protection, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 325 (1991).
“Advocates of prosecution propose that the creation of crimes that punish women who
endanger their fetuses would educate the public through ‘the publicity of the trial, conviction,
and sentencing.’” Id. at 329 (quoting Thompson, The Criminalization of Maternal Conduct
During Pregnancy: A Decision-Making Model for Lawmakers, 64 IND. L. J. 357, 367 (1989)).
44
It is beyond the scope of this Note to detail the plethora of crimes and penalties available
throughout the United States for the use of controlled substances.
45
See e.g., Johnson v. State, 578 So.2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), decision quashed by 602
So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992) (finding, for the first time, a woman guilty of gestational substance
abuse). See also Christina von Cannon Burdette, Note, Fetal Protection – An Overview
Recent of State Legislative Response to Crack Cocaine Abuse by Pregnant Women, 22 MEM.
ST . U. L. REV. 119 (1991) (discussing the delivery of drugs to minors). See also Catherine A.
Kyres, Note, A “Cracked” Image of my Mother/Myself? The Need for a Legislative Directive
Proscribing Maternal Drug Abuse, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1325 (1991) (discussing maternal
drug abuse in relation to child welfare statutes). “Absent an express statutory definition,
courts have had to determine whether the terms ‘neglected,’ ‘abused,’ or ‘dependent’
encompass children born exposed to drugs in utero.” Id. at 1332.
46
Matter of Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). “Since a child has a legal
right to begin life with a sound mind and body, it is within this best interest to examine all
prenatal conduct bearing on that right.” Id. See also Mary J. Pizzo, Comment, Prenatal
Substance Abuse: A Call for Legislative Action in Maryland, 22 U. BALT . L. REV. 329 (1993)
(discussing the criminal liability of the mother for prenatal abuse).
47
A person includes “an unborn human who is viable.” See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE A NN. §
2901.01 B(1)(a)(ii) (West 1999).
48
500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio C.P. 1986). See generally Deborah Ann Bailey, Comment, Maternal
Substance Abuse: Does Ohio Have an Answer?, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1019 (1992)
(commenting on the problems facing Ohio courts when dealing with maternal substance
abuse).
49
Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 939. Luciano Ruiz was born positive for cocaine and heroin from a
drug-addicted mother. Id. at 936.
50
See Alison M. Leonard, Note, Fetal Personhood, Legal Substance Abuse, and Maternal
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E. Public Policy
According to the GAO,51 each drug-impaired child costs the United
States economy approximately one million dollars.52 In order to abate the
problem, there is a trend to protect fetal rights.53 These proposals pertain to
Prosecutions: Child Protection or “Gestational Gestapo”, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 615 (1998)
(exploring the issues surrounding prosecution of women for injuries sustained by their fetus
as a result of their substance abuse). See also Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164
(S.C. Sup. Ct. July 15, 1996) opinion withdrawn and superceded on rehearing by Whitner v.
State, 492 S.E. 2d 777 (S.C. 1997) (finding Whitner guilty of child neglect after giving birth to a
cocaine-positive baby).
51
General Accounting Office.
52
Victoris J. Swenson, et al., Pregnant Substance Abusers: A Problem that Won’t Go Away,
25 ST . M ARY’S L.J. 623, 631 (1994).
53
A sample of proposed legislation for some states in 1998 & 1999:
ARKANSAS, H.R. 1014 requests a study to determine the age at which unborn babies
begin to feel pain; H.R. 1014, 82nd Leg., (Ark. 1999) (enacted). H.B. 1947 amends
code to change presumption of viability from 25th week to 24th week of pregnancy
H.B. 1947, 82nd Leg. (Ark. 1999). H.B. 1613 creates prenatal and early childhood
nurse home visitation program. H.B. 1613, 82nd Leg. (Ark. 1999).
CALIFORNIA, A.B. 1071 allocates 5% of funds from tobacco settlement for health
care to uninsured children and prenatal care. A.B. 1071, 1999-00 Leg. (Cal. 1999).
COLORADO, H.B. 1018 provides prenatal care for undocumented aliens. H.B. 1018,
62nd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1999) (enacted).
CONNECTICUT, H.B. 5718 provides prosecution for crime of violence against unborn
child. H.B. 5718, 1999 Leg. (Conn. 1999).
DELAWARE, S.B. 156 requires insurance coverage for prescription strength prenatal
vitamins. S.B. 156, 140th Leg. (Del 1999).
HAWAII, H.B. 1346 creates offense of endangering the welfare of a fetus and imposes
probation for 6-9 months for the mother. H.B. 1346, 20th Leg. (Haw. 1999).
ILLINOIS S.B. 739 allows for reckless homicide of an unborn child by the operation of
snow-mobiles or water craft. S.B. 739, 91st Leg. (Ill. 1999) (enacted).
KANSAS, H.B. 2319 concerns humane treatment of the fetus. H.B. 2319, 78th Leg.
(Kan. 1999).
KENTUCKY, H.B. 292 includes an unborn child in utero in the definition of human
being. H.B. 292, 1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1998). H.B. 293 allows for prosecution of
wrongful death of an unborn child without regard for gestational stage. H.B. 293, 1998
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1998).
LOUISIANA, S.B. 225 relates to the civil rights of an unborn child. S.B. 225, 1999
Leg. (La. 1999).
MAINE, H.P. 805 creates categories for crimes against unborn children. H.P. 805,
119th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 1999).
MASSACHUSETTS, H.B. 816 defines viability of a fetus, H.B. 816, 181st Leg., 1999
Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999); S.B. 270 establishes family outreach for children prenatal
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social policy as well as all the areas of law discussed supra.54 States such as
Ohio have established substance abuse assessment and treatment referral
through age five, S.B. 270, 181st Leg., 1999 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999); H.B. 780
provides public information for improvement of prenatal care, H.B. 780, 181st Leg., 1999
Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999); S.B. 456 provides pregnant women with information for
improved prenatal care, S.B. 456, 181st Leg., 1999 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999).
MONTANA, H.B. 600 adopts standards to protect children from prenatal exposure to
pollutants. H.B. 600, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1999).
NEBRASKA, L.B. 111 allows for prosecution of wrongful death of an unborn child
without regard for gestational stage. L.B. 111, 96th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 1999).
NEW JERSEY, A.B. 2524 allows for prosecution of murder of a fetus. A.B. 2524,
208th Leg. (N.J. 1998).
NEW MEXICO, H.B. 844 provides prenatal care to uninsured residents. H.B. 844, 44th
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 1999).
NEW YORK, A.B. 6654 allows for prosecution of assault of an unborn child without
regard for gestational stage. A.B. 6654, 222nd Leg. (N.Y. 1999).
PENNSYLVANIA, S.B. 608 requires health practitioners to disclose prenatal diagnosis
policy. S.B. 608, 183rd Leg., 1999-00 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1999).
SOUTH CAROLINA, H.B. 3863 includes unborn child in the definition of a person for
certain crimes. H.B. 3863, 113th Leg. (S.C. 1999).
TEXAS, H.B. 181 establishes the beginning of life to be the moment of fertilization;
H.B. 181, 76th Leg. (Tx. 1999). H.B. 682 relates to the death or injury of an unborn
child; H.B. 682, 76th Leg. (Tx. 1999). S.B. 1725 establishes a neonatal and prenatal
care outreach project for Medicaid recipients. S.B. 1725, 76th Leg. (Tx. 1999).
VERMONT, H.B. 357 establishes crimes against human fetus. H.B. 357, 65th Biennial
Sess. (Vt. 1999).
VIRGINIA, H.J.R. 196 allows funding for prenatal care, H.J.R. 196, 1998 Sess. (Va.
1998); S.B. 198 allows for prosecution of murder of a fetus. S.B. 198, 1999 Sess.
(Va. 1999).
WASHINGTON, S.B. 5390 provides prenatal care to increase healthy births. S.B.
5390, 56th 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1999).
54
See Rebekah R. Arch, Comment, The Maternal-Fetal Rights Dilemma: Honoring a
Woman’s Choice of Medical Care During Pregnancy, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 637
(1996). Arch discusses the reasons that women refuse recommended medical treatment,
including religious convictions and fear. Id. at 642. “Physicians should regard any woman’s
refusal to consent to the treatment they recommend as a serious medical-legal dilemma and
not as an occurrence which serves to merely prompt acquisition of a court order.” Id. at 643.
Arch concludes with:
As technological advances in fetal diagnosis and therapy continue,
health care providers and health care institutions should also
continue to create positively focused alternative methods of
optimizing the outcome and minimizing the risk to patients whose
ethics or moral values will not allow them to participate in every
treatment that is recommended by their physician.
Id. at 673.
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programs,55 while states such as Texas have proposed prenatal outreach
programs. While these programs enhance the chances that a child is born
healthy, there is a long way to go before a uniform system is in place.56
55

Ohio Revised Code § 5111.017 provides:
The department of human services shall establish a program
for substance abuse assessment and treatment referral for recipients
of medical assistance under this chapter who are pregnant and are
required by statute or rule of the department to receive medical
services through a managed care organization. Each such pregnant
woman shall be screened for alcohol and other drug use at her first
prenatal medical examination.
The department of human services shall require each
managed care organization providing services to medical assistance
recipients pursuant to a contract with the department of human
services to inform persons who will provide prenatal medical servi ces
to a pregnant recipient about the requirements of this section. The
department also shall require persons providing prenatal medical
services to a pregnant recipient pursuant to the managed care
organization’s contract with the department to do both of the
following if the person providing prenatal medical services, following
screening, determines the recipient may have a substance abuse
problem: (A) Refer the recipient to an organization certified by the
department of alcohol and drug addiction services for assessment;
(B) Inform the recipient of the possible effects of alcohol and other
drug use on the fetus.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5111.017 (West 1999).
56
See Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Note, The Problem of the Drug-Exposed Newborn: A Return
to Principled Intervention, 42 STAN. L. REV. 745 (1990). Robin-Vergeer opines about the state
of legislation that is still accurate today, a decade later:
Unless legislation clearly delineates when officials may
consider drug-exposed infants neglected and explicitly mandates
reporting in such cases, there is no assurance that the children who
are in real need of intervention will be protected. Because counties
have been forced to grapple with increasing numbers of drug-exposed
infants without comprehensive guidance from the state legislature, a
child in need of protection may be ignored in one county, while a
child with a fully functional family may be removed from his home in
another. Moreover, without statutory guidelines, hospitals are free to
either under- or over-report instances of maternal drug use and
neonatal drug exposure. Screening and county intervention currently
pivot on the luck of the draw. Action depends upon which side of the
county line one lives and upon which hospital door is opened. Only a
coherent and principled vision of when intervention on behalf of the
drug-exposed infant is appropriate will result in like infants being
treated alike.
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of Facts
Adeline Mary (Mattie) Huie was born on October 8, 1993 with cocaine
and alcohol in her blood.57 Molly Ann Huie, Mattie’s mother, had used cocaine
and other illegal narcotics throughout Mattie’s prenatal development.58 From
her birth, Mattie experienced medical problems attributed to Huie’s drug use,
including cerebral palsy and other developmental problems.59 Melissa
Chenault, Huie’s sister, was appointed as Mattie’s managing conservator, and
filed suit, as next friend,60 to compensate Mattie for Huie’s conduct. 61
B. Procedural History
Chenault initiated this suit, as Mattie’s conservator, in the 191st Judicial
District Court in Dallas County, Texas.62 She named Molly Ann Huie, the
mother, and Michael Anthony Riley, the putative father,63 as parties to the

Id. at 755.
57
Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474, 475 (Tex. App. 1999, no writ).
58
Id. See also Brief for Appellant at 2, Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 0596-00279-CV) (citing R. at 222.).
59
Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 475. See also Brief for Appellant at 3, Chenault v. Huie, 989
S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV) (citing R. at 222.).
60
“One acting for benefit of infant, or other person not sui juris (person unable to look after
his or her own interests or manage his or her own lawsuit), without being regularly appointed
guardian.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1043 (6th ed. 1990).
61
Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 475. “Chenault sought damages for past and future medical care,
special education, physical and occupational therapy, loss of earning capacity, disfigurement,
physical impairments, and past and future pain and suffering. She also sought punitive
damages.” Id. See also Brief for Appellant at 3-4, Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex.
1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV) (citing R. at 227.). “Even as she wields the shield of social
conscience and the sword of moral indignation, Appellant unabashedly admits this case is
about money, specifically Appellee’s trust fund.” Brief for Appellee at 20-21, Chenault v.
Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV). “Molly’s trust money should be used
for the damages to her child and should not be available to buy crack cocaine or to pay
lawyers to file motions seeking judicial approval of maternal crack cocaine abuse.” Brief for
Appellant at 3, Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV).
62
Brief for Appellant at 1, Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV)
(Hon. David K. Brooks presiding). “Appellant brought this suit for the real party in interest,
Adeline Mary (Mattie) Huie, a minor, for permanent injuries caused by Molly Ann Huie,
Mattie’s mother[] . . .” Id. at 2 (citing R. at 222.).
63
“The alleged or reputed father of a child born out of wedlock.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1237 (6th ed. 1990).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol33/iss1/5

14

Sylvester: Chenault v. Huie

1999]

CHENAULT V. HUIE

suit.64 In response, Huie filed a motion for summary judgment65 with a
supporting brief.66 After a hearing, the trial court granted the summary
judgment without explanation.67 Chenault nonsuited68 the father and
appealed.69

64

Brief for Appellant at 2, Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV).
Id. (citing R. at 39.). Summary Judgment was filed on July 19, 1995. Id. Chenault filed her
response on August 30, 1995. Id. (citing R. at 92.).
66
Brief for Appellee at 2, Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV)
(asserting that Texas does not recognize a cause of action against a mother for prenatal
injury, and if Texas did recognize the cause of action, parental immunity would bar the claim).
Id. at 2-3.
67
Brief for Appellant at 6, Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV).
“Judge Brooks did not clearly specify the ground upon which he was granting summary
judgment, therefore, Appellant must and will attack all theories advanced in the motion for
summary judgment.” Id.
68
“A term broadly applied to a variety of terminations of an action which do not adjudicate
issues on the merits.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1058 (6th ed. 1990). See also Brief for
Appellant at 2, Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV).
69
Chenault identifies three points of error: 1. “The trial court erred in granting Appellee’s
Motion for Summary Judgment . . .” Brief for Appellant at 2, Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474
(Tex. 1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV). 2. “The trial court erred in granting Appellee’s Motion for
Summary Judgment on the grounds that Texas has not recognized civil liability on the part of
a mother for negligence causing prenatal injury to her child . . .” Id. 3. “The trial court erred in
granting Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that Appellee’s actions
were legally privileged under the Parental Immunity Doctrine . . .” Id. at 3.
Huie answers with two reply points: 1. “The trial court correctly granted
Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment because there is no cause of action against
a mother for prenatal injuries to her child.” Brief for Appellee at 2, Chenault v. Huie,
989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV). 2. “The trial court correctly
granted Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment because the doctrine of parental
immunity would bar the cause of action which Appellant seeks to create.” Id.
65
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Chenault court spuriously refused to establish a legal duty70 that
would parallel the prevailing views 71 of a child’s right to sue for prenatal injury.
A duty72 is the first element to a cause of action for negligence.73 The term is
closely related to, and sometimes used in conjunction with, the standard of
care.74 Foreseeability is inextricably associated with the standard of care.75 To
deny the existence of a duty from mother to fetus, the Chenault76 court
attacked three points of view with respect to foreseeability.77
A. Prior to Conception
It is possible to find a party liable for prenatal injury years before the
child was conceived.78 This concept is on the slipperiest of slopes.79 Every
woman who could bear a child would be required to maintain a healthy
70

“In negligence cases [duty] may be defined as an obligation, to which law will give
recognition and effect, to comport to a particular standard of conduct toward another, and the
duty is invariably the same, one must conform to legal standard of reasonable conduct in light
of apparent risk.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 505 (6th ed. 1990). Standard of care is further
defined as “that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person should exercise in same or
similar circumstances. If a person’s conduct falls below such standard, he may be liable in
damages for injuries or damages resulting from his conduct.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY14045 (6th ed. 1990).
71
See discussion supra Part II and accompanying notes.
72
“A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the person to conform to a certain
standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks.” W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164 (5th ed. 1984).
73
“Negligence . . . is simply one kind of conduct.” KEETON, supra note 72, § 30, at 164.
74
Once again, the wisdom of Prosser and Keeton:
A failure on the person’s part to conform to the standard
required: a breach of the duty. These two elements go to make up
what the courts usually have called negligence; but the term quite
frequently is applied to the second alone. Thus it may be said that
the defendant was negligent, but is not liable because he was under
no duty to the plaintiff not to be.
Id.
75
“If one could not reasonably foresee any injury as the result of one’s act, or if one’s
conduct was reasonable in the light of what one could anticipate, there would be no
negligence, and no liability.” KEETON, supra note 72, § 43, at 280.
76
Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999, no writ).
77
See Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 477-8.
78
See Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977). The court found Mennonite
Hospital liable for transfusing incompatible blood to Renslow eight years prior to her
pregnancy, since it was foreseeable that a woman might become pregnant. Id. at 1253.
79
Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999, no writ).
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reproductive condition, since it is reasonable to assume that a woman may get
pregnant.80 However, the facts of this case do not concern what could go
wrong prior to conception. It is the Chenault court that takes it upon itself to
speculate.81
B. The Moment of Fertilization
The Chenault court argues that a woman may be unaware she is
pregnant,82 which would saddle her with the obligation to monitor her lifestyle
just in case she is pregnant.83 Consequently, her right to privacy would be
infringed.84 Ironically, this lack of awareness poses no barrier to third-party
liability.85 The Chenault86 court described the “unique relationship”87 between a
80

Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 477.
See id. “No duty currently imposed under Texas law has such far reaching ramifications on
matters involving day to day personal decisions.” Id. at 477.
82
Id. at 477.
A woman’s knowledge of her pregnancy may depend on
varying factors such as her health, general physical condition, and
emotional state. In many cases a woman may not be aware she is
pregnant until long after damage to the fetus has been done.
Furthermore, a woman’s initial awareness of her pregnant condition
may depend upon whether the pregnancy was intentional or
unintentional. We perceive no justifiable reason for treating women
who intended to become pregnant differently from those who did not.
Id.
83
Id.
84
See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that a woman’s right to privacy is
weighed against the compelling state interests to protect the unborn child and identifying
viability as the moment that the state’s interest becomes compelling). See also Krista L.
Newkirk, Note, State-Compelled Fetal Surgery: The Viability Test is Not Viable, 4 W M. &
M ARY J. W OMEN & L. 467 (1998). Newkirk discusses the potentially conflicting view of fetal
surgery. Id. at 482. Does the state have a compelling interest to insure the healthiest
newborns possible at the expense of Roe? Id.
It may be argued that the state has an economic interest in
trying to guarantee that the healthiest children possible are born
within its borders. This argument fails under the [biological theory]
because it is in opposition to the argument opposing abortion. It
would be inconsistent for the state to argue for the birth of children
that are not wanted by their mothers, therefore posing an economic
hardship on the state, while arguing that the state’s economic
interest in preventing the cost of malformed children warrants
violating a woman’s fundamental right of privacy.
Id. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 491 (1965) (recognizing the
fundamental right of privacy in marriage).
85
See discussion supra Part II.C.
81
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mother and her unborn child beginning at the moment of conception for both
Texas case law88 and Texas proposed statutes.89 The court’s reasoning is a
contradiction in terms. The court followed the biological theory90 to extol the
virtues of the unique relationship, but the court would not recognize that a duty
exists because of that relationship.91
The court in Bonte v. Bonte92 concurs with the unique relationship
between mother and fetus.93 However, this relationship does not preclude the
mother from being held to the same standard of care as attributed to her for
children already born.94 In a similar case,95 the Texas Supreme Court held that
86

Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999, no writ).
Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 475. See Gerard M. Bambrick, Note, Developing Maternal
Liability Standards for Prenatal Injury, 61 ST . JOHN’S L. REV. 592 (1987) (discussing maternal
liability with respect to the civil context). Bambrick’s discussion is the precursor to the
Chenault decision: “Holding a mother to the same standard of conduct as a third person,
while representing a mechanically correct convergence of current law regarding parental
immunity and recovery for prenatal injury, fails to account for the uniqueness of the fetalmaternal relationship.” Id. at 604. Compare Carolyn L. Andrews, Comment, Parent-Child
Torts in Texas and the Reasonable Prudent Parent Standard, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 113 (1988).
88
See Yangdell v. Delgado, 471 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1971) (holding that a child born alive
may recover for damages without regard for the stage of gestation). See also Sam S. Kepfield,
Perinatal Substance Abuse: The Rhetoric and Reality of “Rights,” and Beyond, 1 CARDOZO
W OMEN’S L.J. 49 (1993) (discussing maternal rights of privacy, autonomy, and integrity).
“[Roe] balanced Texas’ assertion that life began at conception and [Roe’s] contention that
the right to terminate a pregnancy should be unrestricted.” Id. at 53.
89
See generally H.B. 1382, 76th Leg. (Tex. 1999) (defining an individual to include “an unborn
child at every stage of gestation in the uterus of the mother from fertilization until birth.”)
90
See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
91
Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 478.
92
616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992) (holding that a child born alive may bring suit against his or her
mother for prenatal injury caused by the mother’s negligence). “While we recognize that the
relationship between mother and fetus is unique, we are not persuaded that based upon this
relationship, a mother’s duty to her fetus should not be legally recognized.” Id. at 466.
93
Id. The Bonte court summarizes:
We disagree that our decision today deprives a mother of her
right to control her life during pregnancy; rather, she is required to act
with the appropriate duty of care, as we have consistently held other
persons are required to act, with respect to the fetus. The mother
will be held to the same standard of care as that required of her once
the child is born.
Id.
94
The Bonte court reasoned:
If a child has a cause of action against his or her mother for
negligence that occurred after birth and that caused injury to the
child, it is neither logical, nor in accord with our precedent, to
87
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a child may sue his parents for unreasonable exercise of parental authority for
injuries received in an automobile accident.96 The Chenault court still denied
the duty.97 “The life of the law has not been logic . . .”98
The following public policy concerns set out in Stallman v. Youngquist99
and followed by the Chenault court attest to the court’s predicament.
A legal right of a fetus to begin life with
a sound mind and body assertable
against a mother would make a
pregnant woman the guarantor of the
mind and body of her child at birth. As
legal duty to guarantee the mental and
physical health of another has never
before been recognized in law. Any
action which negatively impacted on
fetal development would be a breach of
the pregnant woman’s duty to her
developing fetus. Mother and child
would be legal adversaries from the
moment of conception until birth.100
The court further states that a mother will not disclose substance abuse
or neglect for fear of liability.101 This assertion is ridiculous, since this case will

disallow the child’s claim against the mother for negligent conduct
that caused injury to the child months, days, or mere hours before
the child’s birth.
Id.
95
See generally Jilani v. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1988) (reasoning that the action will not
threaten parental authority or discretion (referring to parental immunity parameters set forth in
Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971) (holding that a parent is immune from suit
for the discharge of parental authority))).
96
See Jilani, 767 S.W.2d at 673.
97
Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 478.
98
OLIVER W ENDELL HOLMES , THE COMMON LAW 1 (General Publishing Company, Ltd. 1991)
(1881).
99
531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988) (finding no cause of action by a fetus, born alive, against its
mother for unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries from an automobile accident). See also,
Cullotta v. Cullotta, 678 N.E.2d 717 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that no cause of action may be
brought against a mother for prenatal negligence).
100
Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
101
Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 478. “Fearing civil liability, some pregnant women may never
reveal critical facts about their conduct to their physicians, resulting in less than adequate
prenatal care.” Id.
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allow a mother to abuse her fetus and take no responsibility for her actions.102
In the Matter of W.A.B., the Texas court of Appeals recognized that “[a]
mother’s use of drugs during the pregnancy is conduct which endangers the
physical and emotional well-being of the child.”103 W.A.B.104 recognized the
breach of duty and subsequently terminated the mother’s parental rights.105
Amazingly, the Chenault court did not give credence to this finding.106
The first case to consider the reasonableness107 of parental discretion
was Grodin v. Grodin.108 Grodin applied a balancing test that measured the
reasonableness of the risk of harm in terms of the utility of a parent’s conduct
in relation to the magnitude of the riskcreated. In the event the conduct was
unreasonable, parental immunity would be unavailable.109 If the conduct were
reasonable, then immunity would be available.110
Chenault offered an overbroad balancing test111 that successfully
dodged112 the issue of establishing a standard of care,113 even though this
court acknowledged “that Huie’s conduct would likely, if not unquestionably, be
found unreasonable under any standard of care.”114 The court missed the
irony of its own opinion. The primary reason the court denied the duty is based
on the broad implications in establishing a standard of care,115 yet the court
had no trouble recognizing unreasonable behavior.116
C. Actual Knowledge
In the event that a mother has actual knowledge117 of her pregnancy,
102

See discussion supra Part II.B.
In the Matter of W.A.B., 979 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. App. 1998, no writ).
104
Id. at 806.
105
The court based their findings on the mother’s criminal history, imprisonment, and illegal
drug use during and after pregnancy. Id. at 807.
106
See Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 478.
107
The court borrowed the term from Plumley v. Klein, 199 N.W.2d 169, 169 (Mich. 1972).
108
301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). The child brought suit against his mother for
damage to his teeth as a result of mother’s use of medication during pregnancy. Id. at 869.
109
See id.
110
See id.
111
Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 478. The court weighs “the ‘social utility,’ the burden of guarding
against injury, and the consequences of placing a legal burden on a pregnant woman.” Id.
112
“These matters are uniquely within the legislature, not the judiciary.” Id.
113
See id.
114
Id.
115
See id.
116
See supra note 87
117
See Joseph S. Badger, Note, Stallman v. Youngquist “No You Can’t Sue Mommy in
103
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logic dictates that she take care of her body in a reasonable manner in order to
maximize the health of the child.118 However, “the life of the law has not been
logic . . .”119 The reasonable parent standard has been adopted by several
jurisdictions.120 This standard measures whether a mother has acted as a
prudent pregnant woman would act given the circumstances of her pregnancy.
This is the point at which the Chenault court121 is unwilling to venture.122 The
legislature has clearly established standards of behavior with respect to drug
abuse and child abuse.123 The legislature has further established outreach
programs to enable uninsured mothers an opportunity to access prenatal
care.124 The lawmakers are setting a higher standard for childcare out of a
concern for the next generation, but Chenault’s 125 decision has gone against
current logic,126 because Chenault rejected the reasonable parent standard.127
Illinois;” The Illinois Supreme Court Rejects Maternal Prenatal Civil Liability, 11 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 409 (1991) (detailing the Stallman decision). “If . . . the standard imposed a duty of
care on a woman only when she had actual knowledge of her pregnancy . . . a woman could
act with impunity towards her fetus at precisely the same time where the fetus is most
susceptible to injury.” Id. at 435. See also Beal, supra note 13. “A standard which assumes a
woman knows when she has conceived may result in the imposition of a duty on a woman to
use care in the treatment of her body long before conception actually occurs.” Id. at 364-5.
See supra note 79 for a reminder of this can of worms.
118
See Pizzo, supra note 46 at 342. “Once a woman has decided to carry her pregnancy to
term she assumes the duty to use reasonable care in ensuring the safety of the fetus.” Id.
See also Michelle D. Wilkins, Comment, Solving the Problem of Prenatal Substance Abuse:
An Analysis of Punitive and Rehabilitative Approaches, 39 EMORY L. J. 1401 (1990)
(discussing the insufficiency of prosecution for prenatal drug abuse). "[E]ven if the woman
knew the hazards of cocaine, she does not actively intend to harm her child as does one who
beats or molests a child. Addicts take cocaine because they are dependent on it, not because
they want to hurt their fetuses.” Id. at 1435. Compare Zimmerman v. Wisconsin, No. 96-CF525 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1996) rev’d 596 N.W. 2d 490 (Wisc. App. 1999) (finding Zimmerman guilty of
attempted first-degree intentional homicide and first-degree reckless homicide). Zimmerman
was quoted as saying, “I’m going to go home and keep drinking and drink myself to death,
and I’m going to kill this thing because I don’t want it anyways.” Don Terry, In Wisconsin, A
Rarity of a Fetal-Harm Case, N.Y. TIMES , Aug. 17, 1996, at A6.
119
OLIVER W ENDELL HOLMES , THE COMMON LAW 1 (General Publishing Company, Ltd. 1991)
(1881).
120
See supra note 37.
121
Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999, no writ).
122
See id. “Inconsistent and unpredictable jury verdicts would render a ‘reasonable pregnant
woman’ standard meaningless.” Id.
123
See supra note 55.
124
See id.
125
Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999, no writ).
126
See Deborah M. Santello, Note, Maternal Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries, 22 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 747 (1988) (discussing the standard of care with regard to maternal liability to an
unborn child). Santello sums up the flow of logic for determining an action for prenatal
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When a child is injured en ventre sa mere128 and subsequently born
alive, the child potentially has recourse against only two sources: third
parties129 and parents. Virtually all jurisdictions, including Texas,130 recognize a
cause of action for negligence against third-parties for injuries to the fetus.131
With the exception of automobile accidents132 and sexual abuse,133 or both,134
injuries:
Those states abolishing parent-child tort immunity and
recognizing third party liability for fetal injuries from the point of
conception would be most receptive to the child’s suit against its
mother. Those jurisdictions partially abrogating the immunity
doctrine and allowing an infant’s action for prenatal injuries to stand
may also be swayed by current social trends and permit a suit of
maternal liability for prenatal injuries. Undoubtedly, states least apt
to allow a child’s cause of action against its mother for negligently
inflicted prenatal injuries are those refusing both to abrogate the
parent-child immunity doctrine and failing to recognize an action for
prenatal injuries.
Id. at 776 (citations omitted).
127
See Andrews, supra note 87 (summarizing a child’s right to sue for prenatal injuries in the
state of Texas). Andrews calls for the abolition of parent-child immunity “and free the
otherwise uncompensated child tort-victims to bring their causes of action to a proper forum
where they can be heard and adjudicated fairly, on the basis of the reasonable prudent parent
standard, without regard to privilege or the shield of immunity.” Id. at 127.
128
“In its mother’s womb.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 534 (6th ed. 1990).
129
Third-parties may include individuals as well as corporations. See Ascuitto v. Farricielli,
711 A.2d 708 (Conn. 1998) (creating exceptions to parental immunity for negligence committed
by parent in the pursuit of business or employment activities, i.e. respondeat superior); see
also discussion supra Part II(C) and accompanying notes.
130
See Delgado v. Yandell, 468 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. 1971) (holding that “a cause of action
does exist for prenatal injuries sustained at any prenatal stage provided the child is born alive
and survives.”) The case involved an automobile accident in which Isabel Delgado, six
months pregnant, was a passenger. Id. at 475. As a result of the accident, Elizabeth Delgado
was born with permanent and disabling injuries. Id.
131
While it is beyond the scope of this Note to detail the plethora of cases that fall into this
category, the Bonbrest case signified the beginning of this recognition. See Bonbrest v. Kotz,
65 F.Supp. 138, 143 (D.D.C. 1946); see also discussion supra Part II(C) and accompanying
notes.
132
See, e.g., Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Me. 1979) (allowing a suit for negligence
committed by parent to the limits of parental insurance coverage); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d
1013 (R.I. 1982) (creating an exception to parental immunity for negligent operation of motor
vehicle).
133
See Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So.2d 264, 266 (Ala. 1989) (creating an exception to parental
immunity for sexual abuse).
134
See Yates v. Lowe, 348 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (creating exceptions to parental
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very few jurisdictions recognize a cause of action against the parent for
prenatal injuries.135 Many jurisdictions stop short of attaching liability by
applying the doctrine of parental immunity.136 A court must acknowledge the
existence of a legal duty before it may apply the parental immunity doctrine.137
Chenault hid behind its inability to mandate a standard of care from mother to
fetus, stepped backwards, and denied the existence of a duty between mother
and child.138
V. CONCLUSION
The Texas judiciary has limited parental immunity protection 139 and
penalized third-parties for injuries to unborn children.140 The Texas legislature
seeks to mandate prenatal care to the uninsured,141 penalizes individuals for
child abuse,142 and recognizes life to begin at the moment of fertilization.143
The judiciary and the legislature created each of these laws, and each
recognizes a certain standard of care for protection of the unborn.144 Yet all
these standards were not enough to protect Mattie’s suffering.145 For the court
to state that a decision in favor of Chenault may actually have a negative
impact on fetal health is absurd.146 The judiciary must rethink its decision when
the abuser has more protection than the abused.
Edward Sylvester147

immunity for negligence committed by parent to the limits of parental liability insurance
coverage and for sexual abuse).
135
See supra note 37.
136
See discussion supra Part II.B.
137
See Andrews, supra note 87 at 129. Andrews postulates: “[The] failure to recognize a
parental duty . . . is untenable. It is paradoxical to hold that other relationships create a duty .
. . but that a parent does not have such a duty towards his own child.” Id. at 124-5 (citations
omitted).
138
See Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 478.
139
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
140
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
141
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
142
See id.
143
See id.
144
See discussion supra Part II and Part IV.
145
Mattie died, at the age of five, just days after the Texas Appellate Court’s decision of April
15, 1999. Telephone interview with Jennifer Austin, Legal Assistant to Attorney John R.
Howie – Counsel for Appellant, (June 23, 1999).
146
See Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 478.
147
I want to thank my wife Karen. With her love and support, all things are possible.
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